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RE-ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-
ROLIFERATION REGIME: A COMPARISON BETWEEN INDIA AND 
NORTH KOREA1
India’s nuclear tests in 1998 greatly challenged the existing international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime that had been carefully maintained by 
the international community since the 1960s. Yet, what is surprising is 
the response from the international community. Although major world 
powers imposed sanctions on India, those sanctions were relatively 
moderate and were lifted over the course of the next few years. More 
strikingly, in August 2007, India and the United States reached an 
agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, effectively ratifying India’s 
admission to the nuclear club of nations, despite earlier US criticism 
of India’s moves to go nuclear. Critics of the India-US deal argue the 
US handling of Indian nuclearization greatly undermine attempts by the 
international community to prevent other states such as the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) from acquiring nuclear 
weapons, which in turn may potentially contribute to a nuclear arms 
race in Asia. In fact, international responses to India’s and North Korea’s 
nuclear programs present opposite approaches in dealing with nuclear 
proliferation. While most countries from the international community, 
particularly the U.S., have ultimately recognized India’s nuclear-power 
status following its 1998 nuclear test, they have taken a much harder 
line towards North Korea following its nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. 
By making a comparison between these two cases, this article assesses 
the effectiveness of the existing international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime, and discusses the potential problems associated with the Indian 
and North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Keywords: Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime, Nuclear Program of India, US-
India Nuclear Agreement, Nuclear Program of North Korea, Six-Party Talks
Introduction
Nuclear explosion tests by India in 1998 and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) in 2006 greatly challenged the existing 
1 A preliminary version of this article was presented at the Workshop as part of the Project 
of Historical Reconciliation and Cooperative Security in East Asia, Eugene and Portland, OR, USA, 
on May 14-17, 2010. The research on India’s nuclear program and US-Indian nuclear agreement was 
conducted during the author’s visit as short-term researcher to Department of East Asian Studies, 
Delhi University in 2009 and Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, India, in 2010.
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nuclear non-proliferation regime carefully maintained by the international 
community since the 1960s. Yet, what rather surprising are the different attitudes 
of the international community in handling both cases. Although most countries 
imposed sanctions on India immediately after its nuclear test, those sanctions 
were relatively moderate and were lifted within the next few years.  In March 
2006, India and the United States reached an agreement on civilian and promised 
to provide technological assistance in exchange for the India’s consent to place 
its civilian nuclear facilities under international surveillance. On the other hand, 
when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006, virtually 
all countries demonstrated a more assertive opposition towards it. The United 
Nations Security Council soon passed Resolution 1718 to condemn the North 
Korean government and impose economic sanctions, claiming its nuclear test to 
be in violation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an immediate threat to 
regional stability. Although the condemnations and sanctions pushed North Korea 
into greater isolation its leaders conducted a second nuclear test in May 2009. The 
Six Party Talks, the only platform to engage with North Korea on dismantling its 
nuclear program, have been a complete failure.2 
Meanwhile, much of the discussion on the nuclear crisis in North 
Korea focuses on how this semi-pariah nation leveraged its power through 
“nuclear politics,” while the entire world (i.e. the US) was inept and unable to 
stop this patrimonial regime from acquiring nuclear weapons.3 Although some 
scholars have noticed the vulnerability of the existing international nuclear non-
proliferation regime and have offered concrete proposals for its reform, few have 
linked the North Korean case to the Indian nuclearization case of a few years 
earlier.4 In fact, India and North Korea present opposite approaches in dealing 
with nuclear proliferation. The international community has tried to place India’s 
nuclear program under international surveillance by recognizing its nuclear-
power status, while adopting a more coercive strategy toward North Korea. This 
difference may explain why North Korea refused to abandon its nuclear program: 
its real objective is to be accorded the status and prestige of a nuclear power 
on par with India. If this is the case, as Victor Cha suggests, the ideal outcome 
Pyongyang expects is an agreement similar to that with India in which “North 
Korea accepts safeguards and monitoring under the International Atomic Energy 
2 Pakistan and Israel are two other countries that have acquired nuclear weapons have re-
fused to join NPT. Discussions of both cases may provide a fuller picture of the nuclear proliferation 
issue, but the author decided to focus only on India and North Korea for two reasons: first, the interna-
tional community attempted to create a new category for India under current nuclear non-proliferation 
regimes; second, observers to North Korea have indicated that Pyongyang’s real intention is to secure 
its nuclear-power status similar to that of India. 
3 Donald C. Hallmann, “Introduction to the Special Issue on North Korea’s Nuclear Poli-
tics,” Asian Perspective, vol. 34, no. 1, (2010), 5-9.
4 Jack I. Garvey, “A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Jour-
nal of Conflict & Security Law Vol. 12 No. 3 (2008), 339-357; Graham Allison, “Nuclear Disorder,” 
Foreign Affairs vol.89, no.1 (Jan./Feb. 2010), pp.74-85; Gregory Schulte, “Stopping Proliferation 
before It Starts,” Foreign Affairs vol.89. no.4 (July/Aug., 2010), 85-95.
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Agency (IAEA) but is also assured of a civilian nuclear energy program.”5 By 
doing so Pyongyang can keep part of its nuclear program beyond the reach of 
international inspectors and make it an effective nuclear deterrent.
This article attempts to answer two questions: Firstly, why did the 
international community weigh the India case differently from North Korea’s? 
Secondly, why did the US adopt such a generous stance to the former contrasted 
towards the latter? The main proposition is that the double standards the US 
(as well as the international community) applied toward the nuclear issue in 
India has undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the primary 
international regime designed to prevent non-nuclear countries from acquiring 
nuclear material and technologies.  This has ruined the success of any attempt 
by the international community to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
program in the future. The first two parts of the article will outline India’s nuclear 
program and the developments of the India-US nuclear deal. This is followed by 
a brief discussion of the North Korean case. On the Indian case, the discussion 
will concentrate on how its political leaders gradually shifted their attitudes from 
the anti-nuclearization of India to advocating nuclear tests, and how the US 
suddenly changed course in its strategy towards New Delhi after the 9-11 terrorist 
attack of 2001. Discussing the North Korean case is a more challenging task 
since its decision-making process and nuclear-weaponry status are still shrouded 
in secrecy. The analysis is mainly based on media sources and commentaries 
from international observer groups such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 
The fourth and fifth parts examine why the international community considers 
India as a different case from North Korea, and why the US formulated divergent 
approaches for dealing with both cases. By making a comparison between India 
and North Korea, the article attempts to uncover how these two approaches were 
formulated over time, and why the double standards adopted by the international 
community have challenged the effectiveness of the existing international non-
proliferation regime. 
India’s Nuclear Program
India’s nuclear program started quite early.  Before gaining independence, 
Homi Bhabha, an Indian physicist trained in Britain, had established the Tata 
Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) to commence research in the new field 
of atomic energy.  In 1957, the Indian government recruited nuclear scientists 
from TIFR to establish the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay, and made 
it the flagship research facility on nuclear energy in the country.6 India’s nuclear 
program went swimmingly in the 1950s and 1960s.  In 1965,  Bhabha even 
5 Victor Cha was deputy chief of US delegation to the  Six Party Talks during the Bush ad-
ministration.  See Cha, “Up Close and Personal, Here is What I Learned,” The Washington Post, June 
14, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/12/AR2009061202685_
pf.html.
6 The institute was renamed Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) after Bhabha’s death 
in 1966.
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claimed that India could become a nuclear power within 18 months.7  The reason 
that India did not go nuclear was the political, economic, and moral concerns that 
dominated the debate.  Politicians and scientists were engaged in two primary 
rounds of debates on the nuclear option in 1964 and 1968:The first round was 
conducted in 1964-65, right after China detonated its first atomic bomb at Lop 
Nor, while the second was introduced in 1968, when India was pressed by the 
international community to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
The first round of debates generated a compromised policy of pursuing the 
“peaceful use of atomic energy”.8 The result of the second debate was that India 
decided not to sign the NPT but did not oppose it either.  In the face of domestic 
opposition, the Indian government conducted the first nuclear explosion test in 
1974, claiming it a peaceful nuclear explosion.9 
At the same time, Indian strategists started to develop a nuclear doctrine. 
One popular view was “recessed deterrence”: India could develop and store 
nuclear weapons without formally declaring it, which would provide a security 
umbrella in case was threatened India with nuclear weapons.  If such a threat arose, 
India could weaponize its nuclear devices on short notice.  Recessed deterrence 
had never been fully recognized by the government, and, as India did not really 
acquire nuclear weapons, its leaders were reluctant to discuss a nuclear doctrine. 
In the 1980s, nuclear proponents became more active in politics as well as in the 
strategic circle, and most of the focus was on developing deterrence capabilities 
to respond to “growing external threats,” namely Pakistan and China.10  The US 
was also considered as an outside great power with the intention to interfere in 
South Asia.  
In 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed the Action Plan 
at the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General 
Assembly at New York on 19 June 1988, calling for international and regional 
nuclear disarmament. His proposal received a cold response from the international 
community, particularly those nuclear powers.  Consequently, Rajiv Gandhi 
ordered the Defense Research and Development Organization to cooperate with 
the Indian Atomic Energy Agency to restart the nuclear program. 
Another factor that influenced India’s decision to conduct a nuclear test 
was the  Western pressure to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
in the mid-1990s.  Although India was one of first few states in the world to 
raise the idea of banning all nuclear tests, the proposed CTBT was considered 
in India as a Western strategy to preclude India’s nuclearization.  This belief was 
strengthened by American officials in the 1990s stating the US goal is to cap, 
7 Stephen Phillip Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Brookings Institution, 2002), 159.
8  George Perkovich, “Bhabha’s Quest for the Bomb,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (May/
June 2000), 56.
9 Communist and some socialist parties formed the anti-nuclear weapon group in this pe-
riod, while Jana Sangh, the forerunner of Bharatiya Janata party (BJP), and some Congress leaders 
such as K. C. Pant, were in favor of the nuclear program. See Cohen (2002), 159-60.  
10 Cohen (2002), 167.
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reduce, and eliminate India and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities.11  In June 1996, 
when Ambassador Arundhati Ghose represented the Indian government at the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, she announced that the country’s security 
interest shall not be compromised by signing the Treaty. When Lok Sabha, the 
lower house of the Indian parliament, began to debate the treaty later that year, 
the anti-CTBT view soon dominated the debate.
 In December 1995, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao attempted to conduct 
nuclear tests but failed to do so due to detection by the United States, which was 
apparently the only country with enough power to influence India in the post-
Cold War era.  Rao later urged his successor, AB Vajpaee, to continue the nuclear 
program.12   It is believed that Vajpaee government’s decision to conduct nuclear 
testing in 1998 was driven by its security concerns with regard to China and 
Pakistan, and, more importantly, the nationalistic ideology of his Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), which had long advocated a nuclear India.13 
The election of 1998 saw the BJP return to power. In fact, Vajpaee had 
tried to conduct a nuclear test in May 1996 when the BJP first won a national 
election, but was unable do so because his government lasted only 13 days—it 
was replaced by a center-left coalition known as the United Front.  Therefore, 
when the BJP came to power again (in the name of National Democratic Alliance) 
and with the help of other regional parties such as the AIADMK from Tamil Nadu 
in March 1998, its leaders were eager for nuclear testing. 
From Nuclear Tests to India-US Nuclear Deal
On May 13 and 15, 1998, India detonated five nuclear devices and 
announced its status as a nuclear weapons state.  This caught the rest of the world 
by surprise, particularly the existing nuclear-power states. The US government 
was shocked because its intelligence failed to warn the administration about 
the tests.  As late as 1996, the Indian government still reiterated its non-nuclear 
policy, and the US estimated that anti-nuclear groups still dominated the nuclear 
debate in India.  Some dubious information also misled the US government: A 
week before the 1998 test, the BJP government’s foreign policy advisor N. N. Jha 
stated in Colombo, Sri Lanka, that India may declare to be a nuclear power absent 
testing.  Non-nuclear powers, notably Canada, Australia, and Japan, imposed 
sanctions on India immediately thereafter.  China, the only nuclear power that felt 
directly threatened by India’s nuclearization, reacted strongly because New Delhi 
defended its nuclear program as a response to a China threat.
Among the great powers that reacted negatively to India’s nuclear 
test, the US deserves greater consideration.  Although the US government 
imposed sanctions against India immediately following the tests, most of those 
11 Ibid. 173.
12 PR Chari, “Remarks on the Seminar of Indo-Pak Nuclear Tests: Ten Years Later,” May 16, 
2008, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies website, www.icps.org 
13 For discussions about BJP’s role in the nuclear program, see Srini Sitaraman, “Domestic 
Politics and Grand Foreign Policy Motivations of the Indian Nuclear Weapons Program,” Journal of 
South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol.14, no 1 (Fall 2000), 57-74. 
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sanctions were lifted by 2000. The US government was more concerned about 
the effectiveness of  the command and control systems in India rather than the 
threat the nuclear weapons countries posed to US military forces in South Asia 
and the Indian Ocean.14 But when India and Pakistan, which had been fighting 
for decades over Kashmir, simultaneously became nuclear powers, the possibility 
of a surprise attack from either side emerged as the  nightmare facing a nuclear 
South Asia.
The US adopted a new path for dealing with the nuclear problem in 
India. The key objective was to negotiate a framework with the government in 
New Delhi to place  India’s nuclear facilities under international surveillance. 
In November 2001, two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Indian 
Prime Minister AB Vajpaee visited the US.  President George W. Bush told him 
that his government was adopting a fundamentally different relationship with 
India, which is to cooperate with India in combating global terrorism.  A Joint 
Working Group to Counter Terrorism was later established for dealing with 
increasing exchanges and technology cooperation in the security field between 
both countries. 15
A real breakthrough in India-US relations came in July 2005, when 
the new Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, from the Indian National Congress 
(INC), visited Washington D.C. During the trip, he made an unprecedented 
agreement with President Bush that enabled both countries to  develop a strategic 
partnership on defense, calling it the Next Step for a Strategic Partnership.  In 
the same agreement, the US government also allowed India to receive civilian 
nuclear reactors from the US even though India was not a signatory to the NPT. 
As a result of the deal, the US government formally recognized India as a nuclear 
power, and began to negotiate with the government about placing its  nuclear 
program under international surveillance.  The Indian-US nuclear cooperation 
was formalized in March 2006, when President Bush visited New Delhi. 
The agreements are violations of the NPT as well as the position of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an assembly composed of 45 nuclear supplier 
states aimed at preventing non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear material 
and technology. What is especially ironic is that the American laws prohibiting 
the US transfer of nuclear technologies were enacted in the mid-1970s in 
response to India’s nuclear test of 1974, and that was formed in 1975 to prevent 
countries like India from acquiring nuclear material and technologies.  The Bush 
government’s granting of India such privileges can be seen as a destruction of 
existing international regimes on nuclear proliferation.  One possible explanation 
in changes of US policy toward India, as provided by Steven Wiseman, chief 
diplomatic correspondent for the New York Times, is that the Bush administration 
came to office with a lot of China-bashing-type thinking compared to Clinton 
14 For details about US sanctions against India (and Pakistan), see Dinshaw Minstry, “Diplo-
macy, Sanctions, and the US-Nonproliferation Dialogue with India and Pakistan,” Asian Survey, vol. 
39. no. 5 (Sep./Oct. 1999), 753-771.
15 Zhang Guihong, US-Indian Security Relations: Implications for China, South Asian Ter-
rorism Portal, http://www.satp.org
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administration’s pro-China stance by selling weapons to China. The Bush 
administration just wanted to do everything it could do to tame China’s military 
ambitions. 16  
According to the India-US nuclear deal of March 2006, the US government 
promised to modify its non-proliferation laws and  facilitate cooperation with India 
on nuclear issues.  India, in turn, agreed to separate its civilian nuclear program 
from military ones, and abide by the international non-proliferation regime. In the 
next three years, both the Bush and Singh administrations, worked hard towards 
getting approval from their respective legislatures on the agreement. The IAEA 
entered the process at this stage, as it had to negotiate with India on the details of 
inspecting  non-weapons nuclear facilities. However, neither the Indian nor the 
US governments were confident India would acquire the waiver from the NSG. 
17 On the Indian side, the United Progressive Alliance, the ruling coalition of the 
Indian government under the leadership of the Indian National Congress, passed 
the confidence vote in Lok Sabha in July 2008 formally endorsing the India-US 
nuclear deal. The government wisely used the energy shortage as a pretext for 
winning support from the public and certain opposition parties.18 
On the US side, President Bush signed the Henry Hyde United States-
India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act in December 2006, giving the 
green light for the US transfer of nuclear technologies to India.  The House of 
Representatives and Senate ratified the deal in September and October 2008, 
respectively.19 On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement 
with India. Soon after that, the United States formally requested the NSG to grant 
a waiver to India for commencement of civilian nuclear trade. The NSG granted 
the waiver to India on September 6, 2008, which allowed India to access civilian 
nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. This makes India the only 
country with nuclear weapons that is not a signatory member to the NPT but still 
allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.  
16 “Q&A; US-India Nuclear Pact,” New York Times, July 20, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/
cfr/international/slot1_072005.html?pagewanted=1 
17 John Cherian, “Long Way to Go,” Frontline, August 1 2008, 20-21.
18 R. Ramachandran, “Project in Peril,” Frontline, August 1, 2008, 22-25.
19 “Senate Approves Indian Nuclear Deal,” New York Times, October 2, 2008,  http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/10/02/washington/02webnuke.html?_r=1
Chronology of India’s nuclear development
1957   Indian government sets up Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC). 
1964   China detonates first nuclear device, prompting India to begin its first nuclear debate.
1968  India decides not to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
1974   India conducts its first nuclear explosion, claiming it to be peaceful.
1988  Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ordered the Defense Research and Development Organization 
 to cooperate with the Indian Atomic Energy Agency to restart the nuclear program.
1995  Prime Minister Narasimha Rao attempts, but fails, to conduct nuclear tests.
1996  Lok Sabha, the lower house of Indian parliament, debates the signing of Nuclear 
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
May 1998  India detonates five nuclear devices, becoming a nuclear power; international community 
 imposes sanctions on India.
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Nuclear Program of North Korea
The North Korean case presents us with a vastly different picture of 
the nuclear issue. In 1993, when its nuclear program was first uncovered by 
the IAEA, North Korea threatened to withdraw from NPT, and refused IAEA 
inspectors access to its nuclear site. In the following year, the US intervened by 
negotiating a deal with North Korea, in which Pyongyang agreed to dismantle 
its plutonium program in exchange for light-water nuclear reactors and fuel oil 
provided by South Korea and the US.  The Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) was established to implement this agreement, but it failed 
to build light-water reactors because of budget constraints, and the US did not 
provide North Korea with enough fuel oil as promised. 
Crisis broke out again in October 2002, when the US suspected that 
North Korea was resuming its nuclear program and asked KEDO to suspend all 
fuel oil shipments. North Korea responded by formally withdrawing from NPT 
in January 2003, and threatened to launch a preemptive strike against US forces 
stationed on the Korean peninsula. To solve the crisis, the Chinese government 
invited the US and North Korean representatives to start negotiations in Beijing in 
April 2003. The negotiations became the Six Party Talks, comprising China, US, 
North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia, in August of that year. The talks 
provided a framework for great powers with interests in the region to discuss with 
North Korea directly on finding a resolution for the nuclear crisis. 
The first three rounds of the talks did not make much progress, but 
September 2005 saw a “breakthrough”—at least it appeared to be so at that 
time— in the fourth round, as North Korea suddenly agreed to abandon its 
nuclear program and promised to return to the NPT as soon as possible. At this 
stage, the Six Party Talks seemed to have achieved two goals that were considered 
unimaginable before: binding all major powers in Northeast Asia together to 
create a political coalition with a common objective and convincing a “rogue” 
state to give up its nuclear weapons. Some analysts even predicted that the talks 
“would be a great opportunity to begin to build new security institutions in one of 
the most volatile regions in the world.”20 
On October 9, 2006, North Korea surprised the entire world again 
20 Peter Van Ness, “Why Six party Talks Should Succeed,” Asian Perspective Vol. 29, No. 2, 
(2005), 244. 
September 2001  US president George W. Bush lifts sanctions against India; both countries 
  agree to cooperate in the field of global war on terrorism. 
July 2005   India and the US agree to develop strategic partnership on defense issues; US 
  government also allows India to procure civilian nuclear reactors from the 
  US.
March 2006  US-Indian nuclear deal signed.
July 2008   Singh government of India passes the confidence vote in the Lok Sabha.
August 2008  IAEA approves the safeguards agreement with India
  NSG granted India the right to purchase material and technologies from 
  nuclear suppliers
October 2008  US Senate ratified the US-Indian civilian nuclear deal.
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by announcing a successful detonation of nuclear devices, declaring itself as 
a nuclear state.21 The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 1718, denouncing the act and imposing sanctions on North Korea 
immediately. North Korea’s nuclear test directly challenged the legitimacy of the 
Six Party Talks as the negotiations had been considered by all members to be the 
most salient way to deal with Pyongyang. Japan even threatened to withdraw 
from the talks. However, since the North Korean government considered the 
nuclear test as a demonstration of national will and power rather than a necessity 
driven by technological developments, a successful detonation of nuclear devices 
granted Pyongyang enough confidence to face great power pressure. Pyongyang 
finally agreed to return to the negotiation table and the Six Party Talks resumed 
in February 2007. In the third phase of the fifth round, North Korea finally agreed 
to freeze its nuclear facilities in Yongbyong, and the other five parties agreed to 
provide energy oil to North Korea again. On July 14, 2007, after receiving fuel 
aid from South Korea, North Korea declared the closure of its nuclear facilities 
and its willingness to dismantle the entire nuclear program. IAEA inspectors later 
confirmed that Pyongyang facilities had been shut down. 
When the international community began believing the Six Party Talks 
to be an effective channel to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon 
program, on April 14, 2009 Pyongyang suddenly announced its withdrawal 
from the talks and declared it would not take part in the talks again. Apparently, 
this withdrawal was in retaliation to the statement by UN Security Council 
the previous day condemning North Korea’s failed “satellite” launch—the 
international community suspected the satellite was in fact a Taepodong-II long-
range ballistic missile. 22 A few weeks later, Pyongyang again surprised the world 
by conducting a new nuclear explosion test on May 25 2009. Martin Kalinowski 
of the University of Hamburg argued that the test was more successful than the 
first one as its explosive yield (about 4 kilotons of TNT) was much higher than 
the estimate of 0.5-0.8 kilotons of TNT in 2006.23 Yet another report based on 
seismic data claimed that although this second test was larger than the first one in 
2006, it was still far short of the expected yield of a Hiroshima-type device. One 
possible explanation is that the device failed to explode properly. If the North 
Koreans built and detonated a plutonium bomb correctly, the explosion should 
yield 10-20 kilotons.24 
21 As late as 2005, certain US analysts were still convinced that North Korea’ nuclear pro-
gram confronted certain technological obstacles and was unable to create a nuclear bomb. See Selig 
S. Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?” Foreign Affairs vol.84. no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2005), 99-110. 
22 “Security Council Condemns Launch by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Agrees 
to Adjust Travel Ban, Assets Freeze, Arms Embargo Imposed in 2006,” UN Press Center, April 13, 
2009, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9634.doc.htm
23  Martin Kalinowski, “Second nuclear test conducted by North Korea on 25 May 2009,” 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker Centre for Science and Peace Research, Universitaet Hamburg, May 
25, 2009, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/177/Kalinowski.pdf
24 Jeffrey Park, “The North Korean nuclear test, What the seismic data says,” Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists Analysis, May 26 2009, http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-north-kore-
an-nuclear-test-what-the-seismic-data-says 
Jebat  Volume 38 (2)  (December  2011) Page | 147
Re-Assessing The International Nuclear Non-Roliferation Regime
Again, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 1874 on June 12 to impose further economic sanctions against North 
Korea. The resolution also allowed UN member states to inspect and destroy 
any cargo from North Korea if the cargo contained goods suspected of being 
connected to its nuclear program.2526 The following day, Pyongyang issued a 
statement condemning the resolution by calling it “another vile product of the 
U.S.-led offensive of international pressure aimed at undermining the DPRK’s 
ideology and its system.” The statement even claimed the second nuclear test to 
be “a self-defensive measure as it was conducted to cope with such hostile acts 
of the U.S.”27
Chronology of North Korea’s nuclear development
1993   North Korea threatened to withdraw from NPT
1994   US reached an agreement with North Korea, promising to provide reactors 
  and fuel oil in exchange for North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear 
  program 
1995   KEDO was set up to monitor and implement the US-North Korea deal
October 2002  North Korea publicly recognized it had resumed its nuclear program; US 
  approached KEDO to stop energy aid to North Korea.
January 2003  North Korea formally withdrew from NPT
April 2003  China invited the US and North Korea to negotiations in Beijing
August 2003  The Six Party Talk debuted in Beijing
September 2005  North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear program and return to NPT during 
  the fourth round of the Six Party Talks.
October 2006  North Korea claimed to have successfully detonated nuclear
  devices; United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed sanctions 
  immediately
February 2007  Six Party Talk resumed; North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear facilities  
  and permit IAEA inspections
July 2007   North Korea shut down nuclear facilities, which is later confirmed by IAEA.
April 2009  North Korea withdrew from Six Party Talks in retaliation for the UNSC’s  
  statement condemning its missile-launching test
May 2009   North Korea conducted a second nuclear test. The test was a success as its  
  explosive yield (4kt) was much higher than that of the previous test
June 2009   UNSC passed Resolution 1874 imposing further economic sanctions against  
  North Korea
November 2010  Chinese government called for Six Party Talks emergency consultation  
  meeting, but was rejected by South Korea and Japan.
25 “UNSC Resolution 1874,” UN Press Center, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/
sc9679.doc.htm
26 Since June 2009, US, South Korea, India, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and South 
Africa have detained or searched North Korean ships or cargos under the terms of Resolution 1874. 
However, a report issued by US Congressional Research Service showed that US was concerned 
about how China implemented economic sanctions as China’s exports of luxury goods by China to 
North Korea is around US$100-160 million a year. See: Mary Beth Nikitin, Mark E. Manyin, Emma 
Chanlett-Avery, Dick K. Nanto, and Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implica-
tions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874,” US Congressional Service Report (April 15, 2010), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40684.pdf, 
27 “DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter- Measures against UNSC’s “Resolu-
tion 1874,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) of DPRK, June 13, 2009, http://www.kcna.co.jp/
index-e.htm. 
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Why India differs from North Korea? 
The NPT is the most important regime for controlling the spread of 
nuclear weapons and technologies in the world today.  Since its creation in 1968, 
187 countries have become signatories. The only countries that have not signed 
NPT are India, Pakistan, and Israel. North Korea ratified the treaty in 1985 but 
announced its withdrawal in January 2003.28 The framework of the NPT divides all 
signatory states into one of two categories: those with nuclear weapons (nuclear-
weapon states) and those without nuclear weapons (non-nuclear-weapon states). 
Those who do not possess nuclear weapons and promise not to develop nuclear 
weapons (falling into the second category) are guaranteed the right to acquire 
nuclear technologies for peaceful use. For the past four decades, this regime has 
functioned well—the international community has successfully pressured certain 
countries from developing nuclear weapons by using NPT as a tool;29 and, when 
the Cold War ended, had persuaded  the former Soviet republics to give up their 
nuclear weapons in return for access to nuclear power technologies (except 
Russia). 
This distinction, however, does not include those countries which aspire 
to develop nuclear weapons and are not signatories to the NPT: India, Pakistan, 
and Israel.  Nor does it include the countries insisting upon developing nuclear 
weapons and thus withdrawing from NPT: North Korea. Since India’s nuclear-
weapon-state status is recognized by the international community, this indicates 
the NPT will only punish those countries that signed the NPT first and then 
decided to withdraw from it. Why is the international community more tolerant 
towards countries such as India  that refuse to be bounded by the NPT? One 
explanation is that India is a more “responsible” state than North Korea, and that 
India needs to develop nuclear weapons to achieve its strategic purposes. In other 
words, India is different from North Korea.
Advocates for a nuclearized India argue that the country is different 
from North Korea in three ways:  First, India is a democratic country with a 
strong tradition of civilian control over the military, while North Korea is run 
by Kim Jong-il’s family with a strong fear of being overthrown by its people or 
by foreign countries. A democratic government in India ensures that its nuclear 
weaponry will be always under effective control. Second, Indian leaders consider 
a nuclear deterrent necessary to national security. For the past four decades, the 
power balance  between China and India has been in China’s favor, and Pakistan, 
the long-time rival of India, has worked towards developing nuclear weapons 
and succeeded in 1998.  India simply needs nuclear weapons as an effective 
deterrent against those threats. For North Korea, nuclear weapons are a bargaining 
instrument for other purposes. Moreover, India sees the testing of its nuclear 
weapons as an achievement towards great-power status, while North Korea does 
not reveal such an intention. Third, so far there is no evidence that India received 
28 Taiwan is not a signatory member either, because it is not a member of the United Nations.
29 South Africa, Taiwan, Brazil, and Argentine, all gave up their nuclear programs in the 
1980s or 1990s. Except Taiwan, all other countries became signatories of NPT afterwards. 
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assistance from other countries to develop its nuclear program, and India has 
reiterated its intention not to export or transfer its nuclear technologies to other 
countries. On the other hand, there have been rumors that North Korea received 
technological support from Pakistan and is likely to assist other countries such as 
Iran in the development of nuclear power. 30
It is necessary to re-evaluate these assessments - the first concerns the 
political system. Past experiences show that authoritarian regimes have been more 
enthusiastic in nuclear programs, as their leaders may consider producing nuclear 
bombs a better way to garner popular support,  thus consolidating their legitimacy. 
In other words, a normal country will not be interested in pursuing nuclear 
weapons. Countries that had nuclear ambitions for political or strategic reasons, 
such as South Africa, Taiwan, Brazil, and Argentine, all gave up their nuclear 
programs after democratization. In fact, it is quite rare for a mature democracy 
to develop nuclear weapons, as the democratic mechanism usually prevents 
governments from allocating too many resources, financially and technologically, 
to building a big bomb. When discussing the India case, the question is not 
whether a democratic state has the right to possess nuclear weapons, but how anti-
nuclear groups had successfully prevented the INC government from obtaining 
the budget for sustaining nuclear research from the 1950s to 1980s,  but then 
failed to do so in the 1990s. 
On closer examination, one finds that democratically elected leaders in 
India have long opposed the NPT distinction and used it as an excuse to reject 
being part of the treaty. In the 1960s, Indians were convinced that the NPT 
granted existing nuclear-weapon states tremendous power and influence on the 
non-proliferation issue, which was unfair for non-nuclear states like India. But 
since India became a nuclear state in 1998, public opinion soon shifted to a new 
position that the NPT simply lacks the ability to manage countries’ aspirations. As 
Munish Puri, an Indian strategic analyst argues, 
when the ‘nuclear not-yets’ become ‘nuclear haves,’ they challenged 
the NPT’s distinction system… Those within the NPT will not accept 
the “outliers” as nuclear weapon states but only as non-nuclear weapon 
states, while those outside of NPT will not rollback their nuclear 
arsenals.31 
Public polls conducted in India also show that Indians generally support 
the India-US nuclear agreement because it grants India better status than that under 
the NPT. A poll in Hindustan Times,  the third largest daily English newspaper in 
India, found that 78 per cent of respondents thought Prime Minister Singh was 
more patriotic than Parakash Karat, the leader of the Communist Party, which 
was part of the ruling coalition but strongly opposed the agreement.  An online 
30 For a comparison among nuclear-weapon states, see: Dana R. Dillon and Baker Spring, 
“Nuclear India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Backgrounder, No. 1935, May 18, 2006, Heritage 
Foundation, www.heritage.org
31 Munish Puri, “India and NPT: A Nuclear Existential Dilemma,” Institute of eace and Con-
flict Studies (IPCS) website: http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-and-the-npt-a-nuclear-existen-
tial-dilemma-1731.html
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poll by Times of India, with the largest circulation among all English-language 
newspapers in the world,  found even more support for the Singh government 
with 96 per cent of respondents saying the nuclear deal was in India’s interests.32 
The Indian case shows that a democratic society may be more receptive to public 
opinions: public might oppose the nuclear program at one time and support it 
another time, depending on whether political leaders need public support to 
proceed with their plans.
Strategic consideration is another reason for the Indian government to 
justify its nuclear program. India has pursued nuclear weapons for very practical 
reasons: it faced direct and immense threats from both Pakistan and China. The 
former has been a long-time rival, and the hostility is unlikely to disappear in near 
future, while China has territorial disputes with India. More importantly, China 
has been a nuclear power since 1964, and had actually defeated India in 1962. 
One Indian senior diplomat even said that India is the only country in the world 
to have fought five times with neighbors since independence (four with Pakistan 
and one with China). Nuclearization gave India more confidence in dealing with 
other great powers and the countries directly threatening India. As Raja Mohan 
indicates: 
Having failed to test (nuclear) weapons before the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty was drafted, in 1968, India was trapped in an 
uncomfortable position vis-à-vis the nuclear order: it was not willing to 
give up the nuclear option, but it could not be formally accommodated 
by the proliferation regime as a nuclear power state...33
With nuclear capabilities, Indian leaders have become more confident in 
discussing India’s role in world affairs, and it is likely to use its new status to 
negotiate a new framework for relations with other great powers.34 
Although India’s nuclear program is a clear violation of the NPT regime, 
it is quite consistent in keeping with the promise of not exporting or transferring 
its nuclear weapons to other countries. The Minister of External Affairs K Natwar 
Singh declared in 2006: 
Article I of the NPT obliges a nuclear weapon state not to transfer nuclear 
weapons to any other country or to assist any other country to acquire 
them. India’s record in this regard is impeccable and a matter of public 
knowledge. This is in contrast to the poor record of some of the nuclear 
weapon states who have been active collaborators in, or silent spectators 
to, continuing clandestine and illegal proliferation, including export of 
nuclear weapon components and technology.35 
32 Indians oppose communists over nuclear deal, the Age News, http://www.theage.com.au/
articles/2007/08/24/1187462521955.html
33 C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 4, July/
August 2006, p. 17.
34 C. Raja Mohan’s article demonstrates this view. See: Mohan (2006).
35 K Natwar Singh, “India and the NPT,” address at the Seminar on Emerging Nuclear Prolif-
eration Challenges, March 28, 2005, Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) website: http://
www.idsa.in/node/1556
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There is no denying India is a responsible nuclear power. This can be attributed to 
the strong and consistent anti-nuclear tradition in the society, and the tradition of 
civilian control over the military. From this perspective, India is indeed different 
from North Korea: the former had publicly debated the nuclear option for over 
three decades prior to the 1998 tests, while the latter had no such discussion.
Therefore, the reason that the international community is more tolerant 
of India’s nuclear program than North Korea’s is that the former has shown more 
transparency and prudence in the decision-making processes, and has made strong 
commitments not to export its technologies. India’s attitude was later rewarded 
by securing its status as a nuclear-weapon state outside of NPT. Although this 
arrangement might benefit both India and NSG members, it has also undermined 
the NPT as an effective anti-nuclear proliferation regime.  It is quite unlikely that 
India will join the NPT in the near future, but will support discussions of building 
some new consensus of non-proliferation outside of the NPT framework in which 
India could be a participant: 
What is warranted at this juncture is the need to evolve a consensus 
outside of the NPT about the kind of scaffolding that could be built to 
quarantine the new nuclear challenges and some initiatives have already 
been taken,” argues C. Uday Bhaskar, Deputy Director of IDSA in New 
Delhi. 36
Conclusion: The US Role and Future Challenges to NPT 
The cases of India and North Korea demonstrate two different ways 
for the international community to handle countries in violation of the non-
proliferation framework design of the NPT. Yet in both cases, it was and is the 
US, rather than United Nations Security Council or IAEA, that decides how to 
handle the issues.  When the US started negotiating with India on the nuclear 
agreement in 2005, there was considerable debate in the US about whether it 
was the right thing to do. Critics say the US recognized India’s nuclear status 
without receiving a clear promise from India of cooperation with the US on the 
war against terror. India, in contrast, retained the right to decide which nuclear 
facility was civilian by nature and would henceforth be placed under international 
supervision. In short, the US side of the deal was clear but it was not clear what 
India would offer in return. Yet, the predominant view was that it was too early to 
say whether the deal would succeed. 
There is a chance that India will not deliver on the strategic partnership, 
especially if cooperating with the US means abandoning positions it 
once endorsed as a leader of the Nonalignment Movement and siding 
decisively with Washington on a range of security issues,” warned 
Ashton Carter at the time.37 
Some scholars offered an alternative view, claiming recognizing India’s (as well 
36 C Uday Bhaskar, “Look Beyond NPT’s Framework,” Times of India, June 14, 2005.
37 Ashton Carter, America’s New Strategic Partner, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006; “A 
Nuclear Test of Wills, India and America,” Economist, April 28, 2007, p. 76.
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as Pakistan and Israel’s) nuclear power status as the best way towards reforming 
the NPT regime. 38After IAEA and NSG granted the waiver to India in 2008, 
the debate about whether the international community was doing the right thing 
on India’s nuclear program came to an end. The US-Indian nuclear agreement 
created an entirely new category for India, under which New Delhi has more 
rights and fewer obligations than non-nuclear-weapon states, and has more 
obligations than nuclear-weapon states. The latter has no obligations at all. For 
India, nuclearization serves two purposes. The practical one is to be an effective 
deterrent against threats from China and Pakistan. The other, a more symbolic 
one, is that India needs nuclear weapons do demonstrate its great-power status 
in South Asia as well as the world stage.  By reviewing the debates within the 
strategic community and political circles in India over the past decades, one finds 
that its leaders have seldom been ashamed of violations of the NPT because this 
country has been actively opposed to the treaty since the 1960s. Indian leaders 
clearly contend that they can better address the problems with the nuclear non-
proliferation regime by remaining outside of the NPT. Yet, nuclear observers 
have pointed out that the NSG waiver for India has destroyed the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, and diminished the incentive for non-nuclear-weapon states 
to stay inside of the NPT.39 A new round of debate about how to reform NPT is 
expected to emerge in the near future.   
Returning to the other question addressed at the beginning of this article: 
Why did the US adopt such a generous stance with India compared to North 
Korea? A plausible explanation is that the US (and perhaps the entire international 
community) had developed a conception that great powers such as India deserve 
the right to acquire nuclear weapons, and India’s nuclear weapons do not 
directly threaten American military deployments in Asia. From this perspective, 
India’s nuclearization is indeed not comparable to that of North Korea because 
the international community cannot accept such a small and isolated country 
developing nuclear weapons as strategic deterrent. Furthermore, North Korea 
did not demonstrate any intention to contribute to the international nuclear 
proliferation regime. 
 Since the US has made India an exception to the NPT via their bilateral 
agreement, it will be extremely difficult for Washington to convince Pyongyang 
to abandon its nuclear program. From this perspective, international recognition 
of India’s nuclear-power status will not only be modeled by “malevolent” regimes 
such as North Korea, but is also likely to set a precedent for other big non-
nuclear powers such as Japan to develop nuclear weapons.40 Although the latter 
38 Arvin Cohen and Thomas Graham Jr., “An NPT for non-members,” Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists vol.60, no. 3 (May/June 2004), 40-44.
39 Benjamin Wastler, “Having Its Yellow Cake and Eating It Too: How the NSG Waiver for 
India Threatens to Undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review vol.33 no.1 (2010), 202.
40 After North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006, Foreign Policy maga-
zine listed 5 countries as potential nuclear states: Japan, Iran, Taiwan, Syria, and South Korea. See: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/10/15/the_list_the_next_nuclear_states 
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scenario looks unrealistic now, but one could still imagine that if Japan decides 
to go nuclear and justifies its decision by claiming threats from North Korea or 
even China, the US (and the rest of the world) might adopt a similar approach 
towards formal recognition. The responses of the international community 
to India and North Korea simply reflect our value perceptions about what a 
great power may justifiable obtain, and what a “rouge state” does not deserve.
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